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Abstract
We study how attitudes to inheritance taxation are influenced by information
about the role of inherited wealth in society. Using a randomized experiment in
a register-linked Swedish survey, we find that informing individuals about the
large aggregate importance of inherited wealth and its link to inequality of op-
portunity significantly increases the support for inheritance taxation. The effect
is almost uniform across socio-economic groups and survives a battery of robust-
ness tests. Changes in the perceived economic importance of inherited wealth and
altered views on whether luck matters most for economic success appear to be the
main driving factors behind the treatment effect. Our findings suggest that the
low salience of inherited wealth could be one explanation behind the relatively
marginalized role of inheritance taxation in developed economies.
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1 Introduction
The taxation of inheritance and gifts has declined in many countries over the recent
decades.1 This decline occurs at a time when the economic significance of inherited
wealth in society appears to have increased. Studies of France and Sweden show
that aggregate bequest and gift flows have doubled in size over the last twenty years
(Piketty 2011, Ohlsson, Roine and Waldenström 2019) and microdata evidence shows
that heirs with the highest income and wealth receive the largest bequests.2 Further-
more, a recent strand in the optimal taxation literature highlights that inheritance tax-
ation can be a useful component of the tax system, especially if the government cares
about equality of opportunity (Farhi and Werning 2013, Piketty and Saez 2013).3
The simultaneous decrease in the reliance on inheritance taxation and increase in
the economic importance of inherited wealth may seem puzzling from a scholarly
point of view. One potential explanation could be related to people’s awareness of the
recent trends in the role of inherited wealth in household portfolios. If people do not
perceive that the societal importance of inheritance has changed, they are less likely
to alter their political stance on its taxation. Policymakers take the public opinion
into account when they balance the social and economic desirability of taxes against
their political feasibility, and this balance appears to be particularly difficult to achieve
in the case of many capital taxes (Mankiw, Weinzierl and Yagan 2009, Scheuer and
Wolitzky 2016, Scheve and Stasavage 2016). Therefore, to understand the evolution
of inheritance taxation in developed economies, it is necessary to study the factors
determining the social acceptance of the inheritance tax. In particular, it may require
an inquiry into what people know about inherited wealth in the economy and how
such knowledge translates into political views of taxation.
This study analyzes attitudes towards inheritance taxation and how they depend
on perceptions of the economic importance of inherited wealth in society. The anal-
ysis is based on new data from a recent household survey in Sweden that targeted
a large, nationally representative, sample of register-linked respondents. A key part
of the survey was a randomized information experiment in which randomly selected
1According to Tax Foundation (2015), thirteen countries (of which eight are European) have re-
pealed their inheritance or estate taxes since 2000. Finland and Denmark have recently witnessed par-
liamentary initiatives to abolish their inheritance taxes.
2Boserup, Kopczuk and Kreiner (2016) and Elinder, Erixson and Waldenström (2018) document,
for Denmark and Sweden, respectively, a positive correlation between bequests and heirs’ income and
wealth. They also find that bequests are more important in relative terms lower down in the income
and wealth distributions. Nikoeï and Seim (2018) find similar evidence for Sweden but also highlight
that poor and wealthy heirs have different consumption patterns which can imply different effects of
inheritance on inequality in the short and long run. Adermon, Lindahl and Waldenström (2018) find
that bequests account for a large, perhaps half, of intergenerational wealth correlations in postwar Swe-
den, and Boserup, Kreiner and Kopczuk (2018) find strong links between bequests and early childhood
wealth status.
3See Bastani and Waldenström (2018) for a recent synthesis of the research literature.
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individuals were exposed to different research-based facts about inherited wealth.4
One of these facts was that approximately half of all household wealth in Sweden
has been inherited. Furthermore, we informed about the fact that heirs with higher
income receive larger bequests and that half of Sweden’s billionaires have inherited
their fortunes.
The estimated treatment effect shows that the popular support for an inheritance
tax increases significantly in response to our information treatment; the support is 30
percent higher in the treatment group than in the control group. Since the treatment
was randomly assigned, this effect has a causal interpretation. We find little evidence
of heterogeneous treatment effects across income, wealth, age, marital status, family
circumstances, educational attainment or political views, although several of these
variables are correlated with the likelihood of supporting inheritance taxation.5
To understand how the treatment effect operates, we first propose a simple theoret-
ical model that highlights three key factors behind people’s support for an inheritance
tax: (i) their perceived share of total wealth in the economy that has been inherited, (ii)
their preferences for redistribution, and (iii) their expected personal tax burden. The
basic lesson is that support for inheritance taxation is likely to be low when people
who are open to the idea of inheritance taxation, and who prefer to live in a society
where the government intervenes to foster equality of opportunity, underestimate the
importance of inherited wealth. The model also captures the idea that concerns over
private economic circumstances can curtail desires to promote equality in society.
We empirically evaluate the role of perceptions by using a question asked early in
the survey about the share of total household wealth that respondents think derives
from past inheritance. Comparing the distributions of perceived shares in the treat-
ment and control group, we find that untreated individuals systematically underesti-
mate the fraction of inherited wealth in household portfolios, and that the distribution
of perceived shares in the treatment group is substantially shifted to the right, in the
direction of the actual fraction. We then link this perception-shift to the increase in
support for inheritance taxation using three different exercises. First, we interpret the
treatment effect on perceptions as a ”first stage” and relate it to the baseline reduced-
form effect.6 Second, we exploit the variable capturing the perception-shift as a ”me-
4In an unpublished companion paper, we make an in-depth descriptive analysis of the survey.
5We do not know how persistent our treatment effect is. Results from previous related studies sug-
gest that effects are stable at least for a few weeks after the initial experiment. For example, Kuziemko
et al. (2015) run a follow-up survey four weeks after their initial survey and find that the estimated
positive effect on the support for estate taxation seems to have persisted. Alesina et al. (2018) found
that their treatment effect of an increased support for income redistribution persisted in a follow-up
survey one week later. An important topic for future research is to analyze the persistence of the effects
from information experiments over longer time horizons.
6The individuals who change perceptions of the wealth distribution in response to our treatment
can be viewed as the ”compliers” of our experiment. Hence, another interpretation of this re-scaled
estimate is that it is an estimated treatment effect on the treated, even though the analogy is not perfect
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diating variable”. Third, we condition the dependent variable on the outcome of the
first stage. All these exercises suggest that the treatment effect on tax support is almost
entirely driven by people who change their perception of the economic importance of
inherited wealth.
The mechanisms underlying the treatment responses can be further examined by
using some other questions in the survey. Perhaps, most importantly, we show that
the treatment has a strong influence on whether or not people believe luck or unfair-
ness is the most important determinant of economic success. The effect is strikingly
similar in magnitude to the treatment effect on inheritance tax support, which is in
line with the equality of opportunity-justification for inheritance taxation. This sug-
gests that respondents associate high economic importance of inherited wealth with
inequality of opportunity.7 We also asked about people’s support for differentially
designed inheritance taxes. Our baseline inheritance tax question referred simply to
a ”tax on bequests” and it was preceded by a brief background about the Swedish
inheritance tax that existed until 2004. This tax had an exceptionally low exemption
threshold, approximately 7,000 EUR per heir, and most heirs were therefore exposed
to this tax.8 We then asked about a tax restricted to ”large” bequests, allowing us to
differentiate between low exemption inheritance taxes (like the Swedish one) and high
exemption inheritance taxes (like those in other countries). By doing this, we are able
to study to what extent self-interested motives play a role in determining individu-
als’ support for inheritance taxation.9 Our results show that the support for the high
exemption inheritance tax is considerably larger than for the baseline low exemption
inheritance tax. We also find that the treatment effect is smaller for the high exemption
inheritance tax. Both these findings are consistent with our theoretical framework.
A number of sensitivity checks suggest that our results are robust across several di-
mensions. The treatment effect is consistent across different survey answer categories
(reflecting different degrees of intensity of support) and types of tax design (such as
proposing to make the inheritance tax revenue-neutral or exempting family firms from
since we lack a true first stage.
7Previous empirical work from different countries has shown that people attach considerable
weight to how incomes have been obtained when forming their views about income redistribution
(Alesina and La Ferrara 2005, Weinzierl 2017, 2018, Almås, Cappelen and Tungodden 2017) and wealth
redistribution (Fisman, Gladstone, Kuziemko and Naidu 2017). Lergetporer, Werner and Wößmann
(2018) use a survey experiment in a different context, showing that equality of opportunity-based argu-
ments are important for motivating the support for certain education policies.
8Exemption thresholds vary between 20,000 and 500,000 EUR in in other European countries and
the exemption threshold is over 5 million USD, see Appendix A.1.
9Kuziemko et al. (2015) study how attitudes to the US estate tax are affected by an experimental
treatment informing people that that only a tiny fraction of US households are wealthy enough to be
subject to the estate tax. They find that this drastically increases the support for the tax. Thus there
seems to be a strong tendency for people to support inheritance taxes that they no not expect to pay.
This also suggests that if one would to perform our experiment in the US context, taking the current US
implementation of the estate tax as given, it would be difficult to separate between self-interested forces
and other determinants of inheritance tax support as the former probably would overshadow the latter.
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inheritance taxation). Moreover, we find that the effect of the inheritance tax treatment
on other capital taxes is negligible, reinforcing the link between providing information
about the importance of inherited wealth and an increased support for inheritance tax-
ation. Finally, we also test for potential experimental setting (Hawthorne) effects and
discuss psychological framing effects, and analyze the effects for individuals who re-
sponded to our survey with different time lags.
Our paper connects to a large previous literature on the relationship between per-
ceived or actual levels of inequality and preferences for redistribution. Models by,
for example, Piketty (1995) and Bénabou and Ok (2001) analyze how preferences for
redistribution are shaped by individual experiences and perceptions of the income-
generating process, and a vast empirical literature addresses these questions in differ-
ent ways.10 A recent strand in the literature uses information experiments and survey
data to identify causal links between perceptions of inequality and the demand for tax-
ation, and are therefore more directly related to our study (see, for example, Cruces,
Perez-Truglia and Tetaz 2013 , Kuziemko, Norton, Saez and Stantcheva 2015, Ashok,
Kuziemko and Washington 2015, Karadja, Möllerström and Seim 2017, Weinzierl 2017,
2018, Fisman, Gladstone, Kuziemko and Naidu 2017, and Alesina, Stantcheva and
Teso 2018). The papers that are most closely related to our study are those that specif-
ically deal with issues relating to capital taxation. These are Kuziemko et al. (2015),
Alesina et al. (2018), and Fisman et al. (2017).
Kuziemko et al. (2015) use survey responses among internet-based task-performers,
so-called Amazon Mechanical Turks, to assess the disconnect between rising inequal-
ity and lack of support for redistribution, in particular, in terms of the taxation of
estates of deceased individuals. While they mainly focus on income taxation, one of
their strongest results is that when informing people that only a tiny fraction (less
than a percent) of all decedents in the US are sufficiently wealthy to be subject to the
estate tax, this increases the support for the estate tax substantially. Whether this ef-
fect reflects a self-serving interest (people support taxes that they do not expect to
pay themselves) or equity concern (people infer from the treatment information that
the distribution of estates is highly skewed) is not clear. Alesina et al. (2018) ask about
attitudes to estate taxation in a cross-country survey context. Their experimental treat-
ment is to expose people to facts about income mobility and this does not appear to
influence people’s support for estate taxation. Fisman et al. (2017) use an experimen-
tal design where they confront a survey population of Amazon Mechanical Turks with
different hypothetical scenarios in which wealth and income have been generated in
different ways. One of their main findings is that respondents become more support-
ive of wealth taxation when wealth is perceived to have been inherited rather than
having been generated through lifecycle savings. They also highlight the importance
10See Alesina, Giuliano, Bisin and Benhabib (2011) for an overview of the literature
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of distinguishing between the optimality and political feasibility of tax policy.
We complement these papers in several ways. First, we analyze the support for
inheritance taxation, and how it responds to information about inherited wealth in
the economy, rather than information about the structure of capital taxes or about
intergenerational income mobility. Second, we study a nationally representative sam-
ple where individuals are drawn from administrative population registers which is
especially valuable when one studies the factors behind the social acceptance of tax
policies. Third, we present a simple theoretical framework to help us understand how
shifts in people’s perceptions of inheritance can translate into changing political sup-
port for inheritance taxation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset
and the experimental design. Section 3 presents the baseline results of how the treat-
ment influences the support for inheritance taxation. Section 4 presents a theoretical
framework for understanding how the treatment effect works via shifts in perceptions
of inherited wealth and Section 5 evaluates this relationship empirically. Section 6
presents extensions and sensitivity analyses, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Experimental design, data and institutional setting
This section presents our survey and register data, describes the information experi-
ment, as well as response patterns and randomization outcomes.
2.1 Survey of tax attitudes
We use data from a survey of tax attitudes that was designed by us and implemented
by Statistics Sweden. The survey was distributed by postal mail to 12,000 individ-
uals during May-June 2017. A sample population was randomly selected from the
adult population (a total of approximately 8 million individuals) within 54 predefined
strata constructed from four register variables: income (3 groups), housing wealth (3
groups), age (3 groups) and gender (2 groups). For each stratum, weights were created
to enable the computation of results representative for the total population.
Responses were received from 5,776 persons, a response rate of 49 percent.11 This
is an unusually high response rate for a mail-based non-governmental survey, which
may partly be explained by the fact that we did not need to ask people about their
personal economic circumstances since these are observed in the registers.12 Analyz-
11Out of 12,000 sampled individuals, 212 were deceased or had emigrated. As part of a standard
procedure for surveys administered by Statistics Sweden, the survey contained a set of reminders (one
where the respondent received a postcard and another reminder containing a new copy of the survey).
In Appendix B.4 we analyze differences between respondents who handed in the survey early versus
those who handed it in later (after one or two reminders).
12Other similar research-based surveys in the Nordic countries have a response rate of around 30–35
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ing the balance of responses using the register information, we find that survey par-
ticipation is positively associated with being married, middle-aged or elderly, born in
Sweden, highly educated and being a high-income earner.13 Therefore, we use calibra-
tion weights designed by Statistics Sweden from observed background characteristics
in order to account for these response patterns. In Section 6.6 and Appendix A.3, we
discuss the stratification and weighting in greater detail as well as present descriptive
statistics across samples showing that the populations are similar and that the calibra-
tion works as intended.14
A central objective when designing the survey was to keep it short and simple. Pre-
vious research suggests that complicated questions or long surveys deteriorate both
response rates and the quality of answers.15 In total, the survey posed 16 questions on
a four-page questionnaire. The first two pages contained introductory questions about
occupational status and housing (which complement the register information), gen-
eral attitudes towards government spending on welfare services and military defense,
views on inequality of opportunity (whether ”luck and circumstance” or ”hard work”
matters most for economic success) and, finally, two questions about the aggregate
economic importance of inherited wealth and housing wealth. As will be discussed
later, one of these last questions will play a prominent role in the paper as it reflects
people’s perceptions of the importance of inherited wealth.
Our main interest in this study are two questions about inheritance taxation. The
first question was phrased in the following way: ”A tax on inheritance should be
introduced”. The second question was ”A tax only on large inheritances should be
introduced”. In both questions, the response alternatives were ”Agree fully”, ”Agree
to a large extent”, ”Agree to some extent”, ”Do not agree”, and, ”No opinion”.
The first inheritance tax question had a brief vignette informing respondents about
what an inheritance (and gift) tax is, and how it was designed in 2004 when it was re-
moved. Importantly, we inform about the (by international standards) low exemption
amount of 7,000 euros. Hence, respondents are induced to think about an inheritance
tax that not only affects very wealthy people, but also those who expect to inherit or
bequeath relatively modest amounts. In contrast, the purpose of the second question
was to induce individuals to think about an inheritance tax with a large exemption
percent (see the discussion in Karadja et al. 2017).
13A detailed examination of response patterns across survey questions shows no strong systematic
patterns across groups of respondents.
14To assess the representativeness of our sample population, we test for differences between the cal-
ibrated sample of respondents and the design-weighted sample of respondents and non-respondents.
The results show that the variables in the calibrated sample are close to population averages but the
variables pertaining to marriage, children at home and taxable income exhibit some discrepancies. As
a robustness check, we have in Section 6.6 carried out our main regression analysis under different
weighting schemes and verified that the main insights from our analysis remain intact.
15Experimental evidence shows that the cognitive burden of survey questions affects both response
time, dropout rates and the quality of answers (Lenzner, Kaczmirek and Lenzner 2009).
6
threshold, affecting only the wealthiest. Throughout the paper, we will use the nota-
tion τLE to refer to the inheritance tax with a low exemption threshold and use τHE to
refer to the inheritance tax with a high exemption threshold.
The Swedish institutional setting actually provides an interesting laboratory to ap-
proach certain important questions. When we ask about an inheritance tax with a low
exemption amount, we provide an anchoring to the historical implementation of the
Swedish inheritance tax. This enables us to analyze how our information treatment
increases the willingness of individuals to support an inheritance tax that not only
promotes egalitarian objectives, but also entails personal economic sacrifices. Con-
ducting a similar experiment in a different context, where the institutional anchoring
is such that only a very small fraction of the population would expect to be burdened
by inheritance taxation, would make it more difficult to assess whether the effect of
our treatment is due to individuals receiving information about the economic impor-
tance of inherited wealth, or whether the effect is due to informing individuals that
they are unlikely to be burdened by the proposed inheritance tax.16
2.2 Register variables
A key advantage with our dataset is that the survey respondents (and their house-
hold members) are linked to administrative registers. This enables the selection of a
nationally representative, stratified sample and provides access to precisely measured
background characteristics. It also reduces the required length of the survey, as we do
not need to ask about variables that we can observe in the registers.
The Swedish register databases are kept for population and tax-related purposes
and contain information about age, gender, marital status and household composition,
as well as tax-based records on income (wage, business income, pension income, inter-
est payments, dividends and capital income, realized capital gains and losses, mutual
fund returns), taxes paid and cash transfers received. Individual pretax taxable la-
bor income (including self-employment income) is our main income variable and in
our analysis we use dummy variables to separate between three income groups: the
bottom half of the distribution (P0-50), the next 40 income percentiles (P50-90) and
the top decile (P90-100).17 Household wealth is calculated using register information
on values of property (houses) and condominium (tentant-owned) apartments, and a
combination of observed and capitalized financial assets and liabilities (see Appendix
A.2 for details). We create four wealth fractiles in the same way as for income. Us-
16Kuziemko et al. (2015) find that approximately 50 percent of the population supports the estate tax
when treated with information about the small fraction of the population that actually pays it. This is
similar to the 41 percent baseline support we find in Sweden for the ”large” inheritance tax.
17We try several alternative income definitions: individual vs household income, labor vs total in-
come, one-year vs three-year averaged income, pretax vs disposable income. The results are qualita-
tively the same across these definitions as shown in Appendix B.2.
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ing a specification with relatively broad wealth categories mitigates the problem of
measurement error in the wealth variable.
Educational information is reported in the education register, covering information
about the years of education and field of the educational degree. We also use informa-
tion about political party vote shares in the Swedish 2018 general elections for each of
the 6,004 election districts using data from the election authority and then link them
to each respondent at the election district level.
2.3 Experimental setup and treatments
We randomly divided the sampled population into three equally sized groups, each
containing 4,000 individuals. The first group received research-based information
about inherited wealth, the second group received information about housing wealth,
and the third group received no special information at all. In this paper, we focus on
the inheritance treatment.18 The purpose of the treatments was to convey informa-
tion about the aggregate importance and distribution of each wealth category. The
treatments came in the form of highlighted facts boxes on the front page of the cover
letter of the survey, but all other information in that letter was identical for all groups.
All three groups also received identical questionnaires.19 Our ambition was to make
the treatment information as neutral and descriptive as possible, avoiding information
that could be interpreted as biased or misleading.
The inheritance treatment consisted of three research-based facts about inherited
wealth in Sweden, presented in bullet points: ”Inherited wealth represents about half
of all wealth in the population.”, ”Those with the highest incomes inherit the most.”
and ”A majority of Swedish billionaires have inherited their fortunes.” The first fact
refers to estimates of aggregate inherited wealth in Sweden by Ohlsson et al. (2019)
and Adermon et al. (2018). The second fact is based on population register data on
inheritances in Sweden, in which estates and bequests of all decedents and their heirs
are linked to income tax registers.20 The third fact relates to journalistic evidence on
the wealthiest billionaires in Sweden (published in the Swedish variant of the Forbes
400) reported in Bastani and Waldenström (2018).21
The key message of the inheritance treatment is that inheritances are quantitatively
important, have an income gradient in the amount inherited, and that they matter par-
18We analyze the housing treatment in a separate paper. However, we use it in one place in this
paper, namely in a robustness check analyzing the occurrence of ”Hawthorne effects” (see Section 6.5).
19On our websites, translated versions of all cover sheets and the questionnaire are available.
20The data come from the Swedish inheritance tax register analyzed by Elinder et al. (2018) (which
focused on the pre-inheritance wealth distribution of heirs.
21Additional support for these statements are found in studies of Denmark (Boserup et al. 2016,
Boserup et al. 2018), France (Piketty 2011), Sweden (Nikoeï and Seim 2018) and the US (Wolff 2015).
Furthermore, Di Tella, Drubra and Lagomarsino (2016) show how attitudes towards business elites
influence people’s attitudes towards progressive taxation.
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ticularly for the wealthiest in society. Informing the general public about the economic
role of inherited wealth is complex and difficult, and we are aware of that this selection
of research facts captures central, though not all aspects of bequests and their distri-
butional impact.22 By providing a combined treatment with these three different facts,
we chose to convey that inherited wealth is important in society and associated with
inequality of opportunity.
We perform balancing checks of the randomization outcome across the treatment
and control group in Table 1. The main message is that there are no indications of
any large systematic differences across the groups. Thus, we can rule out that the
experiment has generated systematic effects on dropout rates within or across groups.
Table 1: Balancing test of the experiment
Inheritance Control Inheritance−Control
treatment group Difference p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male 0.51 0.52 -0.01 0.72
Age 48.91 49.83 -0.92 0.53
Married 0.41 0.47 -0.07 0.09
Children 0.36 0.43 -0.07 0.09
Foreign-born 0.17 0.22 -0.05 0.21
Taxable income, ind. 278 279 -1 0.96
Taxable income, hh. 511 541 -29 0.29
House value, hh. 1,443 1,689 -247 0.09
Wealth, ind. 1,224 999 225 0.35
Wealth, hh. 2,030 1,942 88 0.77
Primary school 0.19 0.20 -0.01 0.74
Secondary school 0.42 0.40 0.02 0.61
University 0.39 0.40 -0.01 0.81
Employee 0.50 0.48 0.02 0.62
Self-empolyed 0.06 0.08 -0.02 0.33
House ownership 0.38 0.41 -0.03 0.39
Apartment ownership 0.25 0.20 0.05 0.12
Observations 1,884 1,944
Response rate (%) 47.4 49.1
Note: All variables are stratification-weighted group averages. Units are [0,1] for all variables except
Age (years) and taxable income, house value and net wealth, which are measured in thousands of
euros (using exchange rate EUR/SEK = 10) for individuals (”ind.”) and households (”hh.”).
22For example, some of the above-mentioned studies find that inheritances are relatively larger in
relation to the pre-inheritance wealth of low-wealth heirs and may therefore decrease certain wealth
inequality measures such as the Gini coefficient. These patterns are found in several contexts, but they
must still be regarded preliminary due to data limitations. For example, there may be problems with
under-reporting of intergenerational transfers due to tax avoidance and tax evasion (especially among
the wealthiest). There is also limited information about funded pension wealth or durable consumer
assets, which are relatively more important among less wealthy households. A different aspect is that
inheritance can be seen as an undeserved advantage and therefore contributes to inequality of oppor-
tunity, independently of the effect of inheritance on the inequality of economic outcomes.
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3 Effects on the support for inheritance taxation
In this section, we present the main empirical estimation of treatment effects on the in-
dividual support for inheritance taxation. We first run reduced form regressions and
then examine effects for different response categories, and analyze potential hetero-
geneity in responses across socio-economic groups.
3.1 Baseline treatment effects
Our main specification is a reduced-form regression that tests the relationship between
individual i’s support for taxation, Supporti, an indicator of belonging to the treatment
group, Treatment, individual controls Xi and a random error term ui:
Supporti = α+ γTreatment + β′Xi + ui. (1)
Table 2 and Figure 1 present coefficient estimates of γ, the parameter of interest. In the
case of a low exemption tax, we find a positive and statistically significant effect of the
inheritance treatment. Average support in the control group is 24.5 percent and the
treatment effect is about eight percentage points, which suggests that the treatment
increases support by about 30 percent. Since the treatment was randomly assigned,
this effect has a causal interpretation. Including individual controls does not affect the
result, which reinforces the above finding of a successful randomization.
It is worth noting that several background characteristics are significantly corre-
lated with supporting inheritance taxation. For example, university-educated respon-
dents are significantly more positive to the tax. This is in line with the model of educa-
tional gradients in the political support for left or right-wing parties in Piketty (2018).
High earnings and self-employment are negatively correlated with the support for in-
heritance taxation, even after controlling for personal wealth.23
23The result that high income but not high wealth individuals are more negative to inheritance tax-
ation may seem puzzling. However, the high wealth group is likely to be rather heterogeneous and
potentially consists of individuals who obtained their wealth in different ways (some through their
own hard work, and others by having wealthy parents).
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Table 2: Treatment effect on the support for inheritance taxation
Low exemption tax, τLE High exemption tax, τHE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.080** 0.078** 0.043 0.052
(0.036) (0.034) (0.041) (0.037)
Married 0.052 0.029
(0.037) (0.039)
Children 0.013 -0.046
(0.045) (0.048)
Foreign-born 0.097 0.061
(0.061) (0.062)
University 0.121* 0.088
(0.062) (0.065)
Self-Employed -0.115** -0.165***
(0.052) (0.052)
House owner -0.032 0.056
(0.047) (0.049)
Apartment owner 0.039 0.179***
(0.060) (0.060)
Income P50-90 -0.050 -0.046
(0.043) (0.045)
Income Top 10% -0.164*** -0.124**
(0.052) (0.058)
Wealth P50-90 0.033 -0.072
(0.043) (0.044)
Wealth Top 10% 0.003 -0.162***
(0.053) (0.055)
Constant 0.237*** 0.159** 0.410*** 0.319***
(0.023) (0.076) (0.027) (0.087)
Observations 3,687 3,568 3,674 3,561
Controls No Yes No Yes
Control mean 0.237 0.245 0.410 0.408
Note: The table shows regression coefficients where the dependent variable is support for low or high
exemption inheritance taxation. Estimates for sex and age dummies are suppressed. *, **, *** denotes
statistical significance at 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-levels.
When asking about a high exemption inheritance tax (columns 3 and 4), this gen-
erates a much higher overall support: 40.8 percent against 24.5 percent support for
a broad tax on inheritance. This higher support signals that self-serving, or ”pock-
etbook”, motives could be at play; people tend to support taxes they do not have to
pay. This is consistent with the positive treatment effect on the support for the US es-
tate tax reported by Kuziemko et al. (2015). These authors informed people that only
a tiny fraction of the population (the richest elite) would pay the tax, and this made
people significantly more supportive of the tax. In our setting, when we inform people
about the economic importance of inherited wealth, we find only a small additional
effect on people’s tax support. The estimated treatment coefficient with controls is
5.2 percent, though statistically not different from zero. While this could indicate a
one-tenth increase in overall support, it is imprecisely estimated and smaller than the
treatment effect on the support for a broad inheritance tax.
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Figure 1: Main treatment effects
Note: Estimated coefficients of treatment effects from Table 2 with 95% confidence intervals.
Notice that the estimates in Table 2 represent average treatment responses in the
treatment group, sometimes referred to as intention-to-treat (ITT) effects. These ef-
fects approximate the impact of information campaigns in ”real world”-settings where
information reaches individuals through broadly distributed channels, such as tele-
vision commercials. Some individuals can be reached through such communication
and can therefore be said to have ”received” the treatment. Others pay no attention,
do not understand or do not accept the information. Thus, some individuals are un-
treated even if they belong to the treatment group. The ITT effect captures the average
treatment effect across all potential recipients, both those who receive the treatment
and those who do not, and hence does not consider the fact that only a fraction of
the treated population complies with the treatment. In Section 5, we discuss average
treatment effects on the treated.
3.2 Heterogeneous effects
Some previous experimental studies examining preferences for redistribution have
found that individuals with different political ideologies respond differently to infor-
mation treatments (for example, Alesina et al. 2018). We now examine this possibility,
first graphically by plotting smoothed local regressions and then by running regres-
sions where we interact the treatment dummy with group characteristics.
Figure 2 shows how the support for a low and high exemption inheritance tax
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varies in the treatment and control groups over the distribution of taxable income,
net wealth, years of education and the political support for left-green parties in the
respondent’s election district. The graphs reveal several interesting patterns.
First of all, the figures reveal how the support for inheritance taxation among un-
treated individuals depends on these background characteristics. We see, for example,
that tax support is clearly hump-shaped in both income and wealth for the high ex-
emption inheritance tax, that the support tends to be increasing in education for the
low exemption inheritance tax, but decreasing in education for the high exemption in-
heritance tax. Support is also, perhaps not so surprisingly, increasing in the vote-share
of left-green political parties.
Figure 2: Heterogeneous effects
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Note: The lines are smoothed locally estimated linear regressions of support for inheritance taxation on
the variables listed in panel headings.
Treatment effects are measured by the vertical distance between the solid and shaded
curves, and they seem to be largest in the tails of the income and wealth distributions,
among more educated individuals and among individuals residing in election districts
with intermediate degrees of support for left-green parties.24 The pattern that treat-
24In appendix A1 we present further graphical analysis of treatment effects over the wealth distribu-
tion by partitioning the sample by respondent age. Younger individuals could face greater uncertainty
(or know less about) their own current or future wealth status, and thereby be less dominated by self-
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ment effects are smaller among the lowest educated and among people living in po-
litically right-wing-leaning neighborhoods is in line with previous findings of Karadja
et al. (2017) and Alesina et al. (2018). It should be mentioned that our results for the
tails are more uncertain since the statistical support is not very large there.
Turning to regression analysis of heterogeneous effects, Table 3 presents estimated
interaction effects for the treatment and ten indicative background variables.25 The
general message is that we find no strong indications of heterogeneity in the treatment
effects. The main effects are often statistically significant with the expected signs, but
the interaction terms are statistically insignificant and, in many cases, close to zero.
The main exception is high-wealth individuals, who appear to decrease their support
for inheritance taxation in response to the treatment.
Table 3: Heterogeneous treatment effects
Low exemption tax, τLE High exemption tax, τHE
(1) (2)
Treatment 0.045 -0.058
(0.075) (0.081)
University 0.048 0.025
(0.071) (0.075)
Treat × University 0.100 0.129
(0.078) (0.082)
Top income decile -0.154*** -0.129*
(0.058) (0.070)
Treat × Top income decile 0.006 0.046
(0.079) (0.092)
Top wealth decile 0.080 -0.025
(0.065) (0.067)
Treat × Top wealth decile -0.147* -0.268***
(0.085) (0.085)
Cut taxes/spending -0.068 -0.075
(0.047) (0.052)
Treat × Cut taxes/spending 0.010 0.052
(0.074) (0.078)
More defense spending -0.119*** -0.243***
(0.044) (0.050)
Treat × Defense 0.023 0.184**
(0.084) (0.090)
Left-green party support 0.083* 0.036
(0.045) (0.049)
Treat × Left-green support -0.019 0.013
(0.071) (0.076)
Observations 3,417 3,407
Controls Yes Yes
Control mean 0.245 0.408
Note: Regression coefficients from equations where dependent variable is support for low or high ex-
emption inheritance taxation. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level.
interested motives when expressing their views on inheritance taxation.
25These are multivariate regressions, showing interaction effects conditional other variables and in-
teractions. In appendix Tables A4 and A4, we show that bivariate variants get about the same results.
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4 A simple model of support and perceptions
4.1 Baseline model
This section outlines a simple model framework to aid us in understanding how in-
forming individuals about the economic importance of inherited wealth may influence
the support for inheritance taxation. In very broad terms, there are two main channels
through which informing people about the importance of inherited wealth could in-
fluence their support for inheritance taxation. First, conveying that inheritances are
quantitatively important may suggest that there is substantial scope for inheritance
taxation to increase the level of redistribution in society and combat inequality in out-
comes.26 Second, the importance of inherited wealth in society is directly linked to
social mobility, which might influence the support for an inheritance tax since it is
usually perceived to be an effective instrument to combat inequality of opportunity.
For the purpose of illustrating mechanisms, we proceed as follows. Suppose that
individuals differ in their perceptions of how important or skewly distributed inher-
ited wealth is in society, and that this perception is represented by the fraction of total
wealth that has been inherited, p ∈ [0, 1]. Our interpretation here is that a higher share
of inherited wealth implies a higher general degree of inequality in society. We also as-
sume that people differ in their preferences, captured by a vector of preference param-
eters θ. The individual support for inheritance taxation, denoted s(p, θ), is assumed to
be determined by these two quantities: the perceived importance of inherited wealth
and policy preferences.
The effect of our information treatment is to transform s into a post-treatment sup-
port for inheritance taxation sˆ = s(q, θ) where q = q(p, a) is the transformed post-
treatment perception of the importance of inherited wealth. The post-treatment per-
ception q depends on the pre-treatment perception p and the factual statement con-
tained in our information treatment, denoted by a.27 We assume that the treatment
shifts p in the direction of the treatment fact, |q− a| < |p− a|.
Denoting by f (p, θ) the joint probability distribution of p and θ, and by fˆ the joint
probability distribution of q and θ, the treatment effect, denoted by ∆, is given by:
∆ =
∫
s(q, θ) fˆ (q, θ)dpdθ −
∫
s(p, θ) f (p, θ)dpdθ. (2)
The formulation s(p, θ) for the support for inheritance taxation is stylized, yet it al-
26For example, simple tax reforms, such as implementing positive inheritance taxation together with
a redistribution of the tax proceeds in a uniform lump-sum manner would unambiguously make the
distribution of disposable income more egalitarian.
27We assume that the preference parameter θ is unaffected by our treatment, which can be motivated
by the fact that in our setting the treatment was designed to be neutral and conveying information rather
than political messages.
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lows to capture an important feature of how the support for taxing a specific tax base
is determined, namely, jointly by preferences for redistribution and information. For
example, if groups of the population who have preferences for an egalitarian wealth
distribution underestimate the extent of wealth inequality, this will result in less sup-
port for redistributive policies as compared to a world with perfect information.
To make additional progress, we postulate a simple decision-rule determining the
support for inheritance taxation where s takes the form
s(p, θ) = 1[p > θ], (3)
where θ is assumed to have statistical support on [0, 1) and 1[·] is an indicator func-
tion taking the value of 1 if the expression in brackets is logically true (and otherwise
is equal to zero). This special case implies that an individual supports inheritance tax-
ation if the perceived importance of total wealth that is inherited exceeds the personal
preference threshold θ. If p, q and θ are independent and distributed according to the
marginal probability density functions f (p), g(q) and h(θ) (with corresponding CDFs
F, G, and H), respectively, we have that:
∆ = E fˆ [s]− E f [s] =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
θ
fˆ (q, θ)dqdθ −
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
θ
f (p, θ)dpdθ =
=
∫ 1
0
[F(θ)− G(θ)] h(θ)dθ.
(4)
To interpret this expression, note that if all individuals underestimate the importance
of inherited wealth and the effect of the treatment is to make individuals believe that
the importance of inherited wealth is greater than their pre-treatment perceptions, we
have that G first order stochastically dominates F, namely, G(θ) ≤ F(θ), which implies
that ∆ > 0. From (4) we can also see that the treatment effect will be substantial if the
effect on perceptions F(θ)− G(θ) is large for preference thresholds θ shared by many
individuals (that is, h(θ) is large). For example, the treatment effect will be substantial
if a large fraction of the population consider a just society to be one where inherited
wealth does not exceed θ = 1/3, but where for many individuals the pre-treatment
perception satisfies p < 1/3 whereas the post-treatment perception satisfies q > 1/3.
4.2 The role of ideological convictions and self-interested motives
The model above describes how shifting perceptions of inherited wealth can lead to
an increased support for inheritance taxation. It applies to individuals who would be
willing to support inheritance taxation, provided that the perceived economic impor-
tance of inherited wealth is sufficiently large.
In reality, there are individuals who never support inheritance taxation and indi-
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viduals who always support inheritance taxation independently of how they perceive
the importance of inherited wealth. For example, some people might appreciate in-
heritance taxation even if the economic importance of inherited wealth is very small
(for example, if they consider every dollar of inheritance as an undeserved advantage
that should be taxed). At the same time, there are people who think that inheritance
taxation is a violation of property rights, and that inheritance should not be taxed even
in situations where almost all the wealth in the economy has been inherited.
Self-interested motives can also be important. Some people expect to inherit or
bequeath large fortunes whereas others expect to inherit or bequeath modest amounts,
or nothing at all. This is likely to create heterogeneity in inheritance tax support, since
attitudes to taxes also depend on how they affect people’s own economic situation.
Thus, a person might support inheritance taxation, not because he or she considers
this to be important from an equality perspective, but because the person does not
think that he or she will be burdened by it.28
The presence of self-interested motives can be analyzed formally by extending the
model above envisioning that individuals, in addition to differing in terms of percep-
tions and preferences for equality, differ in terms of their wealth z. The wealth level z
could be interpreted as the wealth associated with two linked generations, reflecting
either the wealth that the parent generation is planning to bequeath to their children,
or the wealth that the child generation is expecting to inherit. In line with how actual
inheritance taxes differ across countries, and to obtain sharp results, we focus on in-
heritance taxes that differ in terms of an exemption threshold, denoted by m and assume
that the expected inheritance tax payment is zero if z < m.29
Suppose, for the purpose of illustration, that individuals who do not expect to pay
the inheritance tax (z < m) always support inheritance taxation, and that individuals
who face a positive expected inheritance tax payment (z > m) may be in favor of
inheritance taxation. Building on the simple formulation of the support function in
equation (3), and letting ∨ denote the logical ”OR” sign, we let the support for an
inheritance tax be given by:
s˜(p, θ, z, d) = 1[p > θ ∨ z < m]. (5)
Assuming that individuals’ expected inheritances are unrelated to their perceptions
and preferences, and letting R(z) denote the CDF of the inherited wealth distribution
28In our empirical analysis, we find that there is a higher general support for an inheritance tax with
a large exemption (41 percent) compared to a tax with a low exemption (25 percent).
29Recall that in the empirical parts of the paper, we focus on two discrete values of m, correspond-
ing to the survey questions asking about taxes with a low exemption threshold τLE and with a high
exemption threshold τHE.
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over some interval [0, z¯], the expected support in the total population can be written:
E f [s˜] = Pr{p > θ}+ Pr{z < m} − Pr{p > θ ∩ z < m} (6)
= E f [s] · [1− R(m)] + R(m). (7)
We then see that
dE f [s˜]
dm
= R′(m)(1− E f [s]), (8)
which is strictly positive whenever R′(m) > 0 and E f [s] < 1 implying that a tax with
a greater exemption threshold always has a higher average support in the popula-
tion. Furthermore,
dE f [s˜]
dm is decreasing in the number of people who would support an
inheritance tax in the absence of any personal wealth concerns E f [s], which is given
by the statistical relationship between p and θ (recall that E f [s] =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
θ f (p, θ)dpdθ).
What this means is that if the perceived inequality is high, equity motives dominate
self-interested motives, and the support for inheritance taxation is not very sensitive
to the level of the exemption threshold.
Figure 3: Graphical illustration of the model of support for inheritance taxation
Note: The figure shows the mapping of inheritance tax support in our model from the respondents’
ideological position, wealth status and pre-treatment inheritance perceptions.
Figure 3 shows an attempt to graphically illustrate the above discussion. The bot-
tom panel of the figure shows a group of individuals, we may call them ”Egalitarians”,
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who support inheritance taxation independently of how they perceive the economic
importance of inherited wealth. The top panel shows a group of people, we may call
them ”Libertarians”, who always oppose inheritance taxation. Our formal discussion
above pertains to the group of individuals in the middle panel, who we refer to as
”Center” individuals, whose attitudes to inheritance taxation are elastic and can be
affected by the treatment. For these ”centrist” individuals, the support for a high ex-
emption tax is higher than the support for a low exemption tax, following condition
(8). The large gap in support for low values of the inheritance share can be explained
by the fact that even when the perceived inheritance share is very small, there are in-
dividuals who support the inheritance tax for selfish reasons. For higher values of the
perceived inheritance share, the difference in support between the two taxes is smaller
(an increase in E f [s] lowers the derivative in equation 8). We will show the empirical
counterpart of Figure 3 in Figure 5 in the next section.
The effect of an information treatment that increases the average perceived share of
inherited wealth can be thought of as a movement along the lines in figure 3. Formally,
the treatment effect on the support for an inheritance tax with an exemption threshold
of m, can be written as:
∆m = E fˆ [s˜]− E f [s˜] = E fˆ [s] · [1− R(m)] + R(m)−
(
E f [s] · [1− R(m)] + R(m)
)
= ∆ · [1− R(m)].
(9)
This result illustrates that the predicted treatment effect is a decreasing function of the
exemption threshold m of the inheritance tax. The greater is the number of individuals
who support an inheritance tax because they do not expect to pay it, the fewer are the
individuals who can be induced to support it through exposure to information about
the importance of inherited wealth. This feature of inheritance tax support is reflected
in the smaller slope of the upper line in Figure 3.
Notice that if the exemption threshold is very high, such that R(m) ≈ 1, we get
∆m ≈ 0. In other words, the effect of information about distributional outcomes is
likely to be very small in economies where the vast majority of individuals under-
stand that they are very unlikely to pay the inheritance tax. This aspect is consistent
with Kuziemko et al. (2015) who document a dramatic increase in the support for es-
tate taxation when informing respondents that only a tiny fraction of US households
actually are exposed to it. If that study had in addition informed respondents about
the importance of inherited wealth in the economy, the effect of this additional in-
formation would likely have been small. In the Swedish context, in contrast, given
the anchoring of individuals to the broad-based Swedish inheritance tax, most people
would expect to potentially be exposed to the inheritance tax proposed in our baseline
inheritance tax question. This makes Sweden a good laboratory to study the effect of
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information about the importance of inherited wealth on the support for inheritance
taxation, as self-interested motives that make individuals mechanically support inher-
itance taxation are likely to be smaller than in other contexts.
In Table 4, we summarize the findings in this section with a list of theoretical pre-
dictions about how the treatment will affect the support for the low and high exemp-
tion inheritance taxes depending on people’s pre-treatment support for inheritance
taxes, their wealth status and their ideology. For exposition purposes, we focus on
a binary representation of perceptions, using the terminology ”Flat” if the perceived
inheritance share is low, and ”Skewed” if the inheritance share is perceived to be high.
For simplicity, we focus on the ”compliers” of our experiment, namely those who up-
date their perception to ”Skewed” if their pre-treatment perception was ”Flat”. We di-
vide the population into three wealth groups where the ”Poor” group can be thought
of those who do not expect to inherit or bequeath anything, the ”Middle” group rep-
resents those who expect to be burdened by the low exemption inheritance tax but not
the high exemption inheritance tax, and finally, the ”Wealthy” group that is expected
to burdened by both types of inheritance taxes.
The table shows how libertarians never support and egalitarians always support
inheritance taxes, regardless of their knowledge about the distribution of inherited
wealth. In the center group, the baseline (pre-treatment) support is higher for the
high exemption tax than for the low exemption tax. However, the reverse is true for
the treatment effect: it is higher for the low exemption tax and lower for the high
exemption tax. These patterns are broadly in line with our empirical findings.
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Table 4: Teoretical predictions
Ideology Wealth
Pre-treatment support Post-treatment support
status Perceive No tax τLE τHE Perceive No tax τLE τHE
Poor
Flat x Skewed x
Skewed x Skewed x
Liber-
Middle
Flat x Skewed x
tarian Skewed x Skewed x
Wealthy
Flat x Skewed x
Skewed x Skewed x
Center
Poor
Flat x x Skewed x x
Skewed x x Skewed x x
Middle
Flat x Skewed x x
Skewed x Skewed x x
Wealthy
Flat x Skewed x x
Skewed x Skewed x x
Poor
Flat x x Skewed x x
Skewed x x Skewed x x
Egali-
Middle
Flat x x Skewed x x
tarian Skewed x x Skewed x x
Wealthy
Flat x x Skewed x x
Skewed x x Skewed x x
Note: The table shows predictions regarding inheritance tax support based on our model, referring to
the support-rule in equation 5 and Figure 3, for different cases of respondents’ ideological position,
wealth status and pre-treatment inheritance perceptions.
5 Perceptions of inherited wealth
What is the empirical relationship between the perceived economic importance of in-
herited wealth and the support for inheritance taxation? We measure an individual’s
perceived economic importance of inherited wealth using a question asked early in
the survey: ”How large share of the wealth of Swedish households is represented by
past inheritance?”. This question corresponds directly to the inheritance treatment fact
”Inherited wealth represents about half of all wealth in the population.” Notice that
the share of total wealth that has been inherited is tightly connected to wealth inequal-
ity since inherited wealth tends to be, and is likely to be perceived as being, unequally
distributed as well as closely related to inequality of opportunity. From the answers
to this question, we also get an indication to which extent individuals actually have
been treated, that is, to which extent they have read and understood the information
and therefore ”complied” with our experiment.
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5.1 A graphical analysis
Figure 4 shows the distribution of perceived inheritance shares in the treatment and
control group. We see immediately that untreated individuals systematically under-
estimate the extent of inherited wealth in the population. A majority in the control
group believes that at most 40 percent of household wealth derives from past inheri-
tance, and the density peaks at 30 percent. For treated individuals, on the other hand,
the distribution of perceptions is shifted to the right and peaks at a 50 percent inher-
itance share. The peak directly corresponds to the information treatment that ”about
half” of household wealth has been inherited. We therefore regard 50 percent as the
”correct” answer. Notice that responses at 60, 70 and 80 percent inheritance shares
are also substantially higher in the treatment group (90 percent is the largest alter-
native respondents can choose). This could in part be explained by the fact that we
never stated that the inheritance share was exactly 50 percent but ”about half”. How-
ever, it could also reflect a signal that ”inheritance matters” stemming from the other
treatment facts, for example, that heirs with the highest income inherit more. For this
reason, we interpret answers in the range 50 to 90 percent as reflecting a general per-
ception among respondents that the inherited wealth is economically important.
Figure 4: Distribution of responses to question about inherited share
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Note: Both panels show responses to the survey question ”How large share of household wealth do you
think derives from past inheritance?”. The left panel shows this response distribution in the form of
relative frequency and the right panel shows it as estimated Gaussian kernel densities.
One may wonder why not everyone in the treatment group answered correctly to
the question. It is possible that some respondents never looked at the information
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provided on the cover sheet and instead jumped directly to the questionnaire. The
concept ”share of inherited wealth” might be too complex for many individuals, or
respondents might reject the stated fact if they are reluctant to accept research results
in general or if the information provided is too far from their own prior expectations.
Next, we combine the information about how the treatment shifts perceptions with
the empirical relationship between the perceived economic importance of inherited
wealth and the support for inheritance taxation in the control group. This relationship,
which is presented in Figure 5, is the empirical counterpart to the conceptual illustra-
tion that we showed in Figure 3.
Figure 5: Treatment effects on perceived inheritance share and inheritance tax support
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Note: The figure shows the link between the support for inheritance taxation and the perceived inher-
itance share in the control group, estimated as coefficients of smoothed local linear regressions in the
control group. The vertical dashed lines shows the most common observation (mode) of the perceived
share in the treatment and control group.
The first thing to notice is that, consistent with Figure 3, there is a positive re-
lationship between the perceived economic importance of inherited wealth and the
support for inheritance taxation. This reflects that people who have a high preference
for economic equality and support policies such as inheritance taxation, also perceive
inherited wealth to be economically important. The mapping also shows that the sup-
port is consistently higher for the high exemption tax, in line with the ”self-interested
hypothesis”, that an inheritance with a high exemption threshold has a higher number
of supporters than a tax with a low exemption threshold.
The next thing to notice in Figure 5 is the pair of vertical dashed lines indicating the
modes (peaks) of the perception distributions in the treatment and control group (ob-
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tained from Figure 4). If we, somewhat heroically, interpret the relationship between
perceptions and support in the control group as a ”structural” relationship unaffected
by the treatment, we can calculate (by measuring the corresponding vertical distance
on the y-axis) how large a change in support that is caused by the treatment-induced
change in perceptions . Notice that the amount by which the support for inheritance
taxation is increased by a corresponding increase in perceptions is determined by the
local slope of the respective curves. Consistent with our theoretical reasoning, and
our regression results in Figure 1, the slope (and the corresponding treatment effect) is
smaller for the tax on large bequests.
5.2 Econometric tests
As a complement to the graphical analysis, we run parametric tests to assess the re-
lationship between treatment-induced changes in perceptions of the economic impor-
tance of inherited wealth and inheritance tax support. Three alternative approaches
are proposed. The first interprets the treatment effect on perceptions as a ”first stage”
in an instrumental variable-type of analysis.30 The second approach treats the shift in
perception as a mediating variable, reflecting an intermediate outcome between the ini-
tial cause and the final outcome. Finally, the third approach conditions the dependent
variable on the perceived economic importance of inherited wealth.
5.2.1 An ”IV” approach
The treatment effect in Table 2 is an intention-to-treat (ITT) effect, reflecting an aver-
age effect across all individuals in the treatment group irrespectively of whether their
perceptions of the economic importance of inherited wealth were affected by the treat-
ment or not. Indeed, Figure 4 clearly showed that many individuals in the treatment
group perceived a lower inherited wealth share than the treatment information stip-
ulated. Scaling the reduced-form ITT effect by the share of individuals taking up the
treatment thus generates an instrumental variable-type of average treatment effect on
the treated.
For this purpose, we define a dummy variable to capture an individual’s perceived
economic importance of inherited wealth, PerceiveHigh, equaling one for individuals
who perceive that 50 percent or more of household wealth has been inherited. We then
30Note that this will not be a standard IV as the instrument has an independent effect on the depen-
dent variable. We will elaborate upon this below.
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run the following ”first stage” regression:31
PerceiveHighi = β0 + β1Treatment + δ′Xi + ei. (10)
The results are presented in Table 5 and confirm that the treatment affects the per-
ceived economic importance of inherited wealth. The likelihood that a person believes
that inheritance represents a majority of household wealth increases by almost 17 per-
cent as a result of the treatment, an increase by more than one-third of the control
group average of 40 percent.
Table 5: Treatment effect on perceptions of inherited wealth
”Inheritance share is 50 percent or higher”
(1) (2)
Inheritance treatment 0.170*** 0.166***
(0.040) (0.040)
Observations 3,771 3,653
Controls No Yes
Control mean 0.389 0.397
Note: *** denotes statistical significance at the 1%-level.
We would like to emphasize that this result is not the true first stage in a two-
stage analysis of how information shapes preferences for inheritance taxation. To be-
gin with, we do not observe if respondents actually read and understand the treatment
information. Another reason is that the inheritance share question does not cover the
entire set of treatment facts, hence PerceiveHigh may also reflect the other two facts
(that high-income heirs inherit more and that half of all billionaires have inherited
their wealth). Most importantly, however, the treatment is not a valid instrument as it
is likely to influence the main outcome variable, the support for inheritance taxation,
and thus violates the exclusion restriction.
Despite these problems, we still find it informative to see what the average treat-
ment effect on the treated would be assuming the ”pseudo” first stage would be a
valid first stage. Dividing the reduced-form by the ”first-stage” effect, we obtain a
ratio of 0.082/0.166 ≈ 0.49. This can be interpreted to imply that 49 percent of the
individuals who change their perceptions in response to the treatment become favor-
able of an inheritance tax. This is a remarkably high share, suggesting that attitudes to
inheritance taxation can be strongly influenced in contexts where respondents receive
and understand the treatment information.
31We have also defined a variable called Perceived50, which equals one for individuals answering
exactly 50 percent on the inheritance-share question. All the main perception findings remain even
when we use this alternative perception indicator, see Appendix B.3.
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5.2.2 Mediating variable regression
The second approach to analyze the effect of changed perceptions of the economic im-
portance of inherited wealth on tax support is mediating variable regressions. This is
a common method to assess the importance of a variable that potentially links a cause
with an outcome. If the main treatment effect ceases to be significant when including
the mediating variable as a control, the treatment effect is regarded to be fully medi-
ated through that variable, otherwise partial mediation occurs. We use the approach
here to try to extract the part of the treatment effect on the support for inheritance tax-
ation that is operating through changing perceptions of the wealth distribution. Since
we cannot rule out the presence of other (omitted) mediating variables, we pragmati-
cally interpret this regression as a form of descriptive decomposition analysis.
Table 6 shows that the mediating variable has a significant effect on the support for
a low exemption inheritance tax (columns 1-3), around five-six percent, and it reduces
the treatment effect somewhat. Moving on to the high exemption tax (columns 4-6), we
see similar effects of the mediating variable, but the results are not precisely estimated,
consistent with what we found in Table 2.
Table 6: Perception of inherited wealth as mediating variable
Low exemption tax, τLE High exemption tax, τHE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.081** 0.064* 0.054 0.046
(0.034) (0.035) (0.038) (0.038)
PerceiveHigh 0.105*** 0.094*** 0.054 0.046
(0.035) (0.035) (0.038) (0.038)
Observations 3,529 3,529 3,529 3,524 3,524 3,524
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control mean 0.245 0.245 0.245 0.408 0.408 0.408
Note: Dependent variable is a respondent’s support for either low or high exemption inheritance taxa-
tion. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level.
5.2.3 Conditioning the dependent variable on perceptions
As noted above, a concern with the previous parametric approaches is that the treat-
ment may influence tax support both through perceptions and through other factors.
Therefore, we propose a third approach where we decompose the dependent variable
across values of PerceiveHigh.32 Formally, we estimate the following three equations:
1[Supporti = 1] = α+ γ0Treat + β′Xi + ui
1[Supporti = 1, PerceiveHighi = 1] = α+ γ1Treat + β′Xi + ui
1[Supporti = 1, PerceiveHighi = 0] = α+ γ2Treat + β′Xi + ui
, (11)
32The advantage of this approach over the first two is that it does not use a non-excludable instru-
ment to decompose the role of perceptions. We thank Lars Kirkebøen for suggesting the method.
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where 1[·] denotes the indicator function. The estimate γˆ0 is the baseline treatment
effect on tax support, γˆ1 is the treatment effect on tax support among respondents
who perceive a high inheritance share (at least 50 percent) and γˆ2 is the treatment ef-
fect on respondents who perceive a low share (less than 50 percent). Table 7 presents
estimation results that are similar to the preceding analyses, namely that perceptions
appear to play a key role in explaining the treatment effect on inheritance tax support.
While the unconditional effect is 7.8 percent (this is our baseline effect in section 3),
the treatment effect increases to 11.4 percent for those who perceive a high inheritance
share. For individuals who perceive a relatively low inheritance share, the treatment
information has no effect at all (or even a slightly negative effect). These patterns pro-
vide strong evidence that it is indeed changes in the perceived economic importance
of inherited wealth that is the key mechanism underlying the effect of our information
treatment on the support for inheritance taxation.
Table 7: Conditioning support on perceiving a high inheritance share
Low exemption tax, τLE High exemption tax, τHE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Support Support, Support, Support Support, Support,
PerceiveHigh = 1 PerceiveHigh = 0 PerceiveHigh = 1 PerceiveHigh = 0
Treatment 0.078** 0.114*** -0.034 0.052 0.126*** -0.072**
(0.034) (0.028) (0.025) (0.037) (0.029) (0.031)
Observations 3,568 3,570 3,570 3,561 3,561 3,561
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control mean 0.245 0.245 0.245 0.408 0.408 0.408
Note: Dependent variable is support for inheritance taxation as expressed in column headings. *, **, ***
denotes statistical significance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level.
We also examine the conditional treatment effect on the support for a tax on ”large”
inheritances, and find the same pattern. There is a large and statistically significant
treatment effect on respondents who perceive inherited wealth to be economically im-
portant, and no such effect (not even a negative effect) on respondents who do not.
6 Extensions and sensitivity analysis
6.1 Equality of opportunity and inheritance taxation
There could, in principle, be several reasons why individuals increase their support
for inheritance taxation when they change their perceptions about the economic im-
portance of inherited wealth. One possibility could be that individuals consider the
inheritance tax to be efficient, and therefore become more supportive of inheritance
taxation, once they acknowledge that the inheritance tax base is large. While this cer-
tainly could be the case for some individuals, we do not think efficiency considerations
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are likely to be first-order explanations behind the support for inheritance taxation in
the general population.33 Here we test the very common equality of opportunity justi-
fication for inheritance taxation by examining if our information treatment, in addition
to increasing the support for inheritance taxation, also makes people believe luck and
circumstances to be important for economic success. In Table 8, we present the re-
sults from treatment regressions, similar to those above in equation (11), where the
dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if an individual answered that ”luck or
unfairness” is most important for economic success.
Table 8: Treatment effect on views of luck and unfairness
”Luck and unfairness most important behind economic success”
All respondents
Respondents with Respondents with
PerceiveHigh = 1 PerceiveHigh = 0
(1) (2) (3)
Inheritance Treatment 0.090** 0.148*** -0.057
(0.039) (0.032) (0.034)
Observations 3,526 3,526 3,526
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Control mean 0.436 0.436 0.436
Note: Dependent variable is dummy variable equal to one if individual believes that ”luck and unfair-
ness” is more important than ”hard work” to be economically successful. *, **, *** denotes statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
The analysis shows that the treatment makes individuals significantly more in-
clined to respond that luck and unfairness is the most important factor behind success.
The share of respondents who believe that luck matters the most increases by almost
ten percent (a coefficient estimate of 0.09) in the treatment group relative to the control
group. In relation to the number of individuals who already considered luck to be
most important for economic success, this corresponds to an increase of about 20 per-
cent. The estimated coefficients are strikingly similar to those in Tables 2 and 7 for the
support for inheritance taxation, suggesting that considerations relating to equality of
opportunity play an important role in explaining the treatment effect.
33For example, Almås et al. (2017) find that fairness considerations are much more fundamental for
inequality acceptance than efficiency considerations in their study of the US and Norway. Fisman et al.
(2017) study how people motivate their preferences for taxing income and wealth, and find suggestive
evidence that equity considerations tend to dominate efficiency considerations. See also Lergetporer
et al. (2018) for a similar argument in the case of education spending. In the case of inheritance taxation,
the efficiency effects also appear to be somewhat ambiguous. While inheritances imply a negative
income effect on heir’s labor supply (see Kindermann, Mayr and Sachs 2018), the possibility to bequeath
can be an important motivation for parents to work. Moreover, positive inheritance taxation in optimal
tax models is typically discussed on the basis of equity considerations, and not efficiency considerations
(see Piketty and Saez 2013 and Farhi and Werning 2013).
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6.2 Treatment effects on different support categories
Our main analyses used a coding of the outcome variable reflecting ”any support”
for inheritance taxation, but our survey allowed respondents to express three different
levels of support as well as opposition. In Table 9 we examine whether these nuances
in response matter for our treatment effect and its interpretation. In column 1 we
first have our our baseline estimate of 7.8 percent. In column 2 we display the effect
on ”full” support, which is equal to 4.2 percent and only slightly statistically signifi-
cant. The difference between the estimates in column 1 and column 2 suggests that the
treatment also increased levels of less intense support in the categories ”support to a
large extent” and ”support to some extent”. Column 3 shows that opposition ("do not
support") decreased significantly by 7.6 percent, a decrease offsetting the increase in
total support. This implies that the baseline treatment is mainly driven by individuals
who would otherwise have been against the tax becoming positive, rather than indeci-
sive individuals becoming positive. Finally, column 4 shows a specification where the
dependent variable is a multilevel variable where the response alternatives are con-
sidered cardinal, with a coding from 0 to 3 (with 0 indicating opposition, and the three
positive support categories coded 1 to 3). The size of the coefficient estimate is not
crucial and the key result is instead that there is a positive and statistically significant
treatment effect even when considering the joint effect on all different response cate-
gories. The overall message of this section is that our main results are robust to the
specific coding of the dependent variable.
Table 9: Treatment effects on different support categories
Degree of support for inheritance taxation
Any support Full support Opposing
All responses
(multi-level)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.078** 0.038* -0.076** 0.149*
(0.034) (0.023) (0.037) (0.078)
Observations 3,568 3,570 3,570 3,378
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control mean 0.245 0.055 0.678
Note: Dependent variable is either dummies for ”Any support” (baseline), ”Full support” (respondents
who agrees ”fully” or ”to a large extent” with introducing a tax), ”Opposing” or a multilevel variable
”All responses” taking numbers between 0 to 3 for the different levels of support for a low exemption
inheritance tax. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level.
6.3 Revenue neutrality and family-firm successions
There are two important additional aspects of inheritance tax design that we have not
yet discussed but that was asked about in the survey. The first one is the possibility of
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a revenue neutral inheritance tax. In the survey we ask about the support for an inher-
itance tax that is described as being offset by reductions in other taxes. This question
is relevant in a high-tax country like Sweden where the overall tax burden could over-
shadow the support for any new taxes. The second aspect is tax treatment of family
firms successions, which has attracted much attention in policy debates about inheri-
tance taxation in most countries, including Sweden.34 Our survey contains questions
that refer explicitly to both of these aspects of inheritance taxation.
Table 10 shows treatment effects, based on equation (11) for both revenue neutral
and family-firm exempting inheritance taxes. The results suggest smaller effects than
in our baseline regressions, which indicates that the increased support for inheritance
taxation documented in our main analysis is by no means conditional on lowering
other taxes or exempting family firm successions.35 The effects among respondents
who perceive a high economic importance of inherited wealth, are larger and statisti-
cally significant. For this subgroup, the treatment effects are only slightly smaller than
for the baseline inheritance tax (see Table 7).
Table 10: Support for revenue-neutral and family-firm exempting inheritance taxation
Revenue-neutral inheritance tax Inheritance tax exemptingfamily-firm successions
Support Support, Support, Support Support, Support,
PerceiveHigh = 1 PerceiveHigh = 0 PerceiveHigh = 1 PerceiveHigh = 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.028 0.082*** -0.054* 0.051 0.105*** -0.054**
(0.037) (0.030) (0.029) (0.032) (0.025) (0.023)
Observations 3,578 3,580 3,580 3,531 3,532 3,532
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control mean 0.294 0.289 0.301 0.254 0.217 0.281
Note: The dependent variable is the support for an inheritance that is either revenue neutral (survey
question referring to a ”tax on bequests, and lower other taxes”) or exempts family firms (survey ques-
tion referring to a ”tax on bequests, but not on family firms”). The notation *, **, *** refers to statistical
significance at the 10%-, 5%-, 1%-level, respectively.
6.4 Effects on the support for other taxes
Our survey also covered questions about the support for other capital and non-capital
taxes. If the treatment effect indeed is driven by individuals’ changing perceptions of
the economic importance of inherited wealth, we would expect the treatment effect on
the support for other capital taxes to be smaller as compared to the effect on the sup-
port for inheritance taxation. The reason for this is that inheritance taxation appears to
34Issues relating to the succession of family-firms were common objections to the Swedish inheri-
tance tax. See Henrekson and Waldenström (2016) for an in-depth historical analysis of the Swedish
inheritance tax debate 1885-2004.
35Here it should be noted that family firms represent a very heterogeneous concept as they include
not only small business owners but also multi-million dollar firms.
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be a more direct way to tax inherited wealth in comparison to other capital taxes that
not only target inheritance but also other forms of capital, such as life-cycle savings.
This distinction between the inheritance tax and other capital taxes is particularly im-
portant given the link between inheritance tax support and equality of opportunity
(see Section 6.1).
Table 11 shows the effects of our inheritance treatment on the support for other cap-
ital taxes (columns 1-7) and non-capital taxes (columns 8-12). A wealth tax (column
1) has not existed in Sweden since 2007, but it is still discussed in the contemporary
political discourse (Piketty 2014, Atkinson 2015).36 The estimated effect is small and
insignificant, but the overall support for introducing a wealth tax is still high with
almost half the population in the control group expressing some support.37 We ask
about several different taxes on capital income, and find no effect on the taxation of
realized capital gains on house sales (column 3), stock market transactions (column
4), bank interest income (column 5), dividend income (column 6) or corporate income
(column 7). While there is a relatively high overall support for these taxes, with a con-
trol group support between 27 and 49 percent, there are no clear treatment effects. This
lack of effects is consistent with the idea that our inheritance treatment primarily in-
creases support for inheritance taxation and ”equality of opportunity”-type of policies
(one could argue that receiving capital income to a greater extent is associated with
the exertion of personal effort in comparison to receiving an inheritance). Property
taxation is another important capital tax, which has been reduced in Sweden in recent
years. About one third of the population supports the idea of taxing property (column
2), but the inheritance treatment does not shift its support.
36While great advances have been made in understanding the distributional importance of wealth,
there are few empirical studies analyzing the efficiency costs of wealth taxation. Recent evidence from
Denmark in Jakobsen, Jakobsen, Kleven, and Zucman (2018) suggests that the efficiency effects are
notable only in the very top of the distribution.
37However, ”full support” for introducing a wealth tax increases from 0.13 to 0.18 (t-stat 1.7), a 40-
percent increase.
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Table 11: Treatment effects on other capital taxes
Support for capital taxes (by tax base):
Wealth Property Capital gains: Bank Dividend CorporateHouses Stocks interest income profit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treatment 0.029 0.033 0.008 0.032 0.030 -0.020 0.018
(0.037) (0.036) (0.038) (0.037) (0.035) (0.037) (0.038)
Observations 3,667 3,496 3,699 3,699 3,699 3,699 3,699
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control mean 0.490 0.301 0.381 0.482 0.270 0.448 0.424
Support for non-capital taxes (by tax base):
Labor Top labor Vehicles CO2 Alcoholearnings earnings (gasoline)
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Treatment -0.048 -0.038 0.044 0.014 0.044
(0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.037) (0.036)
Observations 3,590 3,579 3,587 3,591 3,602
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control mean 0.577 0.578 0.500 0.570 0.689
Note: The dependent variable is the support for the taxes listed in the column headings.
The support for non-capital taxes is also unaffected by the inheritance treatment.
Treatments effects are insignificant and close to zero for the support for taxing earnings
through the municipal income tax (column 1), high earnings (approximately the top 15
percent of wage earners) through the central government income tax (column 2), per-
sonal vehicles (column 3), personal vehicle carbon-dioxide emissions (column 4) and
alcohol (column 5). Once again, these results suggest that our inheritance treatment
is not capturing broader aspects of redistribution and taxation, but rather particular
aspects of inherited wealth and inheritance taxation.
6.5 Hawthorne effects
A common concern in experimental studies is that the experimental setting might have
an independent effect on treated respondents, irrespective of the actual content of the
treatment. Such influences are sometimes labeled Hawthorne effects.38 While there was
no specific information in our survey indicating to respondents that they were being
part of an experiment, one concern could be that the information boxes placed in the
opening letter possibly could convey that there is something special with the survey.39
38The term ”Hawthorne effect” refers to a firm in which workers appeared to become more produc-
tive after a reorganization of the work process, but where subsequent research argued that the effect
was due to the associated monitoring of the workers rather than the organizational changes. See Levitt
and List (2011) for a discussion of the Hawthorne effect in experimental design.
39In any experimental context of this kind, there is an important trade-off between increasing the
take-up of the experiment (increasing the fraction of compliers) and the risk of introducing salience
effects by providing a too eye-catching information treatment.
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To examine the influence of a potential Hawthorne effect contaminating our esti-
mated treatment effect, we use the fact that our survey contained a second treatment,
a housing wealth treatment. The housing wealth treatment contained facts structured
in a similar way as the inheritance treatment: ”Approximately 60 percent of house-
holds own their home.”, ”House prices have increased dramatically, by four times on
average in twenty years.” and ”The wealth gap between owners and renters is widen-
ing.”.40 We use this treatment in two different tests: first as the information treatment
itself, and then as the control group in the baseline inheritance treatment regression.
Table 12 presents the results from these two tests and the main finding is that neither
of these two tests indicates any important Hawthorne effects in our experiment. Using
the housing treatment as the actual treatment (columns 1-3) generates no large or sta-
tistically significant effects on the support for inheritance taxation. Using the housing
treatment as reference control (columns 4-6) results in positive and statistically sig-
nificant effects, reassuringly similar in size and statistical significance as our baseline
estimates.
Table 12: Hawthorne effects
Support for low exemption inheritance tax (τLE)
House treatment
Inheritance treatment
(House treatment as control)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.016 0.016 0.066* 0.059
(0.032) (0.032) (0.036) (0.036)
PerceiveHigh -0.005 -0.005 0.078** 0.069**
(0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035)
Observations 3,620 3,582 3,582 3,554 3,515 3,515
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control mean 0.245 0.245 0.245 0.245 0.245 0.245
Note: The table shows linear regression results, with dependent variable being support for low ex-
emption inheritance tax. Columns 1-3 use the housing treatment as the information treatment and the
standard control group. Columns 4-6 use the inheritance treatment as the information treatment and the
housing treatment group as the control group (thus omitting the standard control group). PerceiveHigh
defined as one if respondent answers that the inheritance share in total household wealth is 50 percent
or higher. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level.
6.6 Weighting alternatives
Our main analysis uses response-calibrated weights when estimating treatment effects
on the support for inheritance taxation. This weighting is motivated by the ambition to
study the opinions of a nationally representative sample population. The calibration
was determined by the correlation between observable individual characteristics (age,
40The first housing fact derives from Statistics Sweden reporting that 60 percent of households live in
a detached house or a tenant-owned apartment. Housing is probably the most salient form of ”popular
wealth”, widely held in the Swedish population and the largest single asset of most households.
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marital status, country of origin, income and education) and group-specific empirical
response rates.41 However, using weighted observations when estimating treatment
effects from an information intervention can raise some potential concerns. First, if
an individual’s response is correlated with unobserved characteristics, for example,
attitudes to inheritance taxation, then the use of response-adjusted calibration weights
might bias the results. Second, it can be argued that analyses of individual attitudes
should not be weighted at all. For example, Gelman (2007) and Solon, Haider and
Wooldrige (2015) point out that the use of weights depends on the question at hand,
and while they may be important when calculating population statistics or accounting
for biased response patterns, they could be less crucial, when estimating effects on
individual responses, depending on the type of questions asked.
We try to address these concerns by presenting, as a robustness check, results using
three alternative weighting schemes in our main treatment regression. The first one
uses the design weights which were constructed in order to adjust for the over-sampling
of certain groups in our stratified sample population. The second uses response weights,
which account for systematic differences in response rates across groups in the popu-
lation.42 The calibrated weights are the product of the design and response weights.
Finally, the third check is to not use any weights at all (or, equivalently, to weight uni-
formly). Notice that when abstaining from weighting, we remove both the adjustment
for our intentional stratification in the survey design and the adjustments intended
to mitigate potential biased response patterns due to some groups (especially elderly,
non-migrants, high-income earners) responding more frequently than others.
Table 13 shows treatment effects on the support for inheritance taxes using the
four alternative weighting schemes. The main finding is that regardless of weighting
approach, the treatment effect on support for a low exemption inheritance tax remains
positive and statistically significant. The effect is roughly similar when only adjusting
for the stratification (column 2), but drops by about half when one uses individual
responses, without adjusting for differential response patterns across groups (columns
3 and 4). The support for a high exemption tax also looks largely the same, and here
the differences are smaller. In fact, when not weighting observations at all, the positive
effect for the high exemption tax is more precisely estimated.
We conclude that, while the use of different weighting schemes might bring some-
what different aspects of the treatment outcomes to light, the weighting scheme does
not take away the paper’s main finding of positive and significant information effects
on the support for inheritance taxation.
41In appendix A.3, we describe the different weighting procedures in greater detail and also present
descriptive statistics regarding the representativeness of the respondent population.
42Response weights are constructed from partial correlations between responses and observed indi-
vidual background characteristics.
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Table 13: Weighting approaches
Low exemption tax, τLE High exemption tax, τHE
Weights:
Calibrated Design Response None Calibrated Design Response None
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment 0.078** 0.067** 0.034* 0.027* 0.052 0.049* 0.049** 0.035**
(0.034) (0.028) (0.020) (0.014) (0.037) (0.029) (0.024) (0.016)
Observations 3,568 3,568 3,687 3,568 3,561 3,561 3,674 3,561
Controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Control mean 0.245 0.248 0.207 0.222 0.245 0.426 0.407 0.418
Note: Calibrated weights (columns 1, 5) are the product of design and response weights. Design weights
(columns 2, 6) adjust the stratified survey population to make it nationally representative. Response
weights (columns 3 and 7) adjust for differential response patterns across population groups in age,
marital status, country of birth, income and education. No weights (columns 4, 8) means that individual
observations are used without any adjustment for population representativity or systematic response
patterns. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level.
6.7 Psychological framing
It is possible that providing information about inheritance increases attention to issues
relating to inheritance, such as providing support for inheritance taxation or becom-
ing more aware about the importance of inherited wealth, irrespective of the actual
content provided in our information treatment. Such reactions could reflect psycholog-
ical framing (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, Ariely et al. 2003) or so-called experimenter
demand effects which might arise if respondents adjust their answers according to what
they believe to be the wishes of the survey designer (Zizzo 2010, de Quidt et al. 2018).
Given our experimental design, we cannot rule out the existence of such effects. How-
ever, it is not obvious how such effects would operate in the current setting. Moreover,
the act of providing information per se does not seem to increase the support for in-
heritance taxation as shown by the Hawthorne tests (Section 6.5). We have also found
that providing information about the role of inherited wealth makes people believe
that luck is more important for economic success, which is a common justification for
taxing bequests.
7 Conclusions
Using a randomized survey experiment on a register-linked Swedish sample, we found
that exposing individuals to research-based facts about inherited wealth, increases the
support for inheritance taxation significantly. The effect appears to be driven by in-
dividuals’ changing perceptions about inherited wealth and their altered views on
whether luck and circumstance is considered to matter most for economic success.
Overall, we find strong evidence that the common equality of opportunity justifica-
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tion for inheritance taxation plays a key role in understanding the determinants of the
support for inheritance taxation.
A possible implication of our findings is that the low salience of inherited wealth,
which our study has documented, could be one explanation behind the relatively
marginalized role of capital taxation in developed economies. If people feel that in-
equality in general has increased, but without perceiving specifically a growing impor-
tance of wealth and wealth inequality, this could trigger increased support for income
taxation but not necessarily for wealth taxation. We hypothesize that this could be one
explanation behind the current decline of inheritance taxation in rich countries during
a time when the economic importance of inherited wealth appears to have increased.
Our findings have been obtained in a Scandinavian context with low levels of pre-
tax inequality and high political support for redistribution. It is often argued that the
difference in support for redistribution between the US and the Scandinavian coun-
tries reflects a difference in social perceptions regarding the fairness of market out-
comes and the underlying sources of income inequality (Alesina and Angeletos 2005,
Almås et al. 2017). Our paper suggests that this reasoning might need to be modified
since people in different countries do not only differ in terms of preferences for re-
distribution and thoughts on fairness, but also in terms of their knowledge about the
wealth distribution. Thus, the support for tax policy is likely to not only be related to
education (Piketty 2018), but also to the narratives adopted in the public debate. Our
results suggest that a greater availability and exposure to research findings about the
wealth distribution can have real effects on the political support for taxation.
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A Data appendix
A.1 Institutional setting
Sweden is a high tax country with an ambitious welfare state and relatively low levels
of economic inequality. The tax-to-GDP ratio is around 45 percent, which is among
the highest in the world. At the same time, capital taxation in Sweden does not de-
viate much from other developed countries. Total capital tax revenue is around five
percent of GDP, which lies at the OECD average. Sweden’s capital tax revenue derives
primarily from the corporate tax (about half) while the rest derives from property tax-
ation and personal capital income taxes. There is a broad-based proportional tax rate
on capital income of 30 percent.43
Since the 2000s, Sweden has experienced a gradual reduction in its reliance on
wealth-based capital taxes. The Swedish inheritance and gift tax was abolished in
2004. At the time of its removal, the inheritance tax was levied on a large share of
all bequests, with a basic exemption threshold of only 7000 EUR. Tax rates started at
10 percent and reached a top rate of 30 percent for bequests exceeding 60,000 EUR.
The exemption level was exceptionally low by international standards, and has been
discussed as a factor contributing to the relatively low popularity of the inheritance tax
among Swedish households.44 The wealth tax was abolished in 2007 and the property
tax was sharply reduced in 2008.
Table A1: Comparison of the level of inheritance taxation across countries
Basic deduction Marginal inheritance tax rate (%)
(thousand euros) Lowest Highest
Denmark 37 15 15
Finland 20 7 19
France 100 5 45
Germany 500 7 30
Netherlands 20 10 20
Sweden 7 10 30
United Kingdom 270 40 40
USA 4,675 18 40
Note: All numbers refer to children-heirs, which typically correspond to the lowest tax rates and largest
exemption thresholds. Sweden refers to 2004 when the inheritance tax was removed. The UK and
US refer to estate taxes while the other countries refer to inheritance taxes (paid by the heirs). Basic
deduction amounts are converted into euros using 2017 average exchange rates.
The macroeconomic importance of personal wealth and inherited wealth has in-
creased notably in Sweden since the 1980s according to estimates in Waldenström
43For an in-depth discussion of capital taxation in Sweden, see Bastani and Waldenström (2018).
44See Henrekson and Waldenström (2016) for a historical study of the rise and fall of Swedish in-
heritance taxation and Hammar, Jagers and Nordblom (2006) for survey evidence on the popularity of
Swedish taxes.
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(2016, 2017) and Ohlsson et al. (forthcoming). The ratio of national wealth to national
income increased from around 200 percent in the 1980s to 500 percent in the 2010, with
the entire increase being driven by the accumulation of wealth in the private sector.
Inherited wealth has also become more important. The total annual inheritance flow,
including both bequests and gifts, has doubled in size relative to national income since
the 1990s. The aggregate share of inherited wealth in total private wealth has been rel-
atively stable around 50 percent in Sweden in the 2010s, increasing only slightly over
the past decades. This level is approximately the same as in other Western countries,
as estimated by Piketty (2011) and Piketty and Zucman (2015).
The distributional impact of inheritance in Sweden has recently been studied in
several studies. and Adermon et al. (2018). Elinder et al. (2018) find that the distribu-
tion of bequests tends to be highly skewed, with a Gini coefficient at around 0.70-0.80.
Bequest size increases in the pre-inheritance income and wealth of heirs, which means
that heirs with higher income receive larger bequests. Nikoeï and Seim (2018) have
found similar evidence for Sweden, and they have also studied how differential con-
sumption behavior among relatively poor and rich heirs differs so that the long-run
consequences of inheritance may differ. At the same time, estimates show that the rel-
ative importance of bequests, expressed as the bequest share of heir’s pre-inheritance
income and wealth, is larger in the lower parts of the distribution. This pattern has
also been found in the US (Wolff 2015). Finally, these studies have also found that be-
quests are an important determinant of the persistence of wealth across generations,
and may account for approximately half of the intergenerational mobility of wealth.
Similar patterns have been found for Denmark (Boserup et al. 2018).
A.2 Constructing net wealth measures at the individual level
We define individual and household wealth as the sum of the value of non-financial
and financial assets minus debt (see Table A2 for descriptive statistics). Our wealth
measures are calculated using register information on property and apartment values,
together with a combination of observed and capitalized financial assets and liabilities.
Lundberg and Waldenström (2018) contains a detailed discussion of capitalization ap-
proaches to individual wealth estimation in Sweden.
Non-financial assets are essentially owner-occupied housing (houses and apartments)
and other assets (land, forest property etc.) The property tax register provides infor-
mation regarding the tax-assessed values of all properties (houses, holiday homes,
apartment buildings, agricultural land), which we have transformed to market values
using municipality-level sales-price ratios. The apartment register provides informa-
tion about apartments (rental vs. owner-occupied apartments, number of square me-
ters, household members etc.). We approximated the market value of owner-occupied
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apartments by multiplying their size in square meters by the average sales price per
square meter using a special data set containing district-level sales prices divided
into different apartment-size classes. We used the data from 2017 that we purchased
from Svensk Mäklarstatistik, a company specializing in developing statistics for the
Swedish housing market.
Financial assets derive from a variety of register sources. Market values of mutual
funds (such as the special investment vehicle known as ”Kapitalförsäkring”, as well
as unit-linked and non-unit-linked mutual funds) and some listed stocks can be cal-
culated based on the taxable imputed rate of return, which is equal to the fund value
multiplied by a statutory, flat, imputation rate. Other financial assets are more difficult
to assess properly. For these assets, we followed a simple capitalization approach by
dividing the observed interest and dividend income by average rates of returns from
national aggregate income statistics and stocks as reported in the financial accounts.
This procedure implies that we capture business equity; listed and non-listed, only to
the extent that it generates dividend income. Pension assets in collectively held occu-
pational pension funds are not included, but private pension savings in mutual funds
are observed through the imputed taxed capital income.
Financial liabilities are the sum of capitalized bank debt (mainly mortgage debt)
and student loans (register-based). Bank debt is estimated using tax return-reported
interest payments and the average interest rate in the financial accounts.
Table A2: Descriptive and distributional statistics
Mean SD Min P25 P50 P90 P99 Max
Male 0.514 0.5 0 0 1 1 1 1
Married 0.439 0.496 0 0 0 1 1 1
Children 0.681 0.999 0 0 0 2 4 5
Foreign-bortn 0.193 0.395 0 0 0 1 1 1
Primary school 0.191 0.393 0 0 0 1 1 1
Secondary school 0.414 0.493 0 0 0 1 1 1
University 0.395 0.489 0 0 0 1 1 1
Years of education 12.1 2.7 7 11 12 16 17 19
Self-employed 0.0731 0.26 0 0 0 0 1 1
House-owner 0.392 0.488 0 0 0 1 1 1
Apartment-owner 0.227 0.419 0 0 0 1 1 1
Taxable inc., ind 27.8 27 0 13.6 26 48.4 95.3 1295
Total inc., ind 32.1 98 0 14.3 26.8 53.3 133 14320
Disposable inc., ind 25.5 69.6 -16.2 13.7 22.1 40.9 84 11740
Net wealth, ind 112 729 -4447 -0.015 25.5 303 935 40087
Taxable inc., hh 52.6 44.2 0 25.8 46.5 95.3 186 1295
Total inc., hh 59.7 115 0 26.7 48.9 105 242 14320
Disposable inc., hh 47.3 80.2 -16 24.2 39.8 80.8 165 11740
Net wealth, hh 199 1072 -3669 0 61 511 1859 104001
Note: Most characteristics as dummy variables. Income and wealth in thousands of euros.
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A.3 Survey response patterns and calibration
The sample population of 12,000 individuals was drawn randomly from the Swedish
administrative register databases so as to be representative for the entire Swedish pop-
ulation. In total, 5,776 individuals responded to our survey, yielding a response rate
of 49 percent (after subtracting 209 deceased or migrated individuals).
The sample was stratified according to 54 different strata based on four variables:
housing assets, gross total income, age and sex. The housing asset strata were the fol-
lowing: group 1: 0–1 million SEK, group 2: 1–5 million SEK, group 3: above 5 million
SEK. We define gross total income as taxable earnings including capital income and
realized capital gains and used the following strata: group 1: 0–460,000 SEK, group 2:
460,000–1.1 million SEK, group 3: above 1.1 million SEK. For the age variable, we used
the following categorization: group 1: 18–39 years, group 2: 40–64 years, group 3: 65
years and above. Finally, sex corresponded to two groups.
For each individual, a weight is calculated so that the resulting weighted popu-
lation is representative for the whole Swedish (adult) population. The original de-
sign weights were based on register variables and the 54 strata. As is the case in most
surveys, response was not entirely random in the sampled population and higher re-
sponse rates were observed for older and higher-earning individuals. Therefore, a
regression-based calibration was conducted by Statistics Sweden, resulting in a set of
calibrarion weights according to a standardized procedure. These calibration weights
are then used in our analysis to render it nationally representative. Table A3 compares
means across the population sample and the sample of respondents, using either de-
sign weights or calibration weights. After calibration, there are few differences across
these populations. The main exception is taxable income, which is somewhat lower
on average among the respondents. There are also some deviations in terms of the in-
cidence of marriage and having children at home. Note that all of these characteristics
are included in the vector of control variables used in the regressions. As shown in
section 6.6 in the main text, our main qualitative results are robust to the specific type
of weighting used in the analysis.
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Table A3: Representativeness of the respondent population
General population Respondents t-statistics
(design weights) (design weights) (calibration weights) (2)-(1) (3)-(1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Male 0.497 0.505 0.511 0.43 0.75
(0.008) (0.012) (0.017)
Age 49.4 55.8 49.1 9.29 -0.44
(0.3) (0.4) (0.6)
Married 0.483 0.571 0.432 4.93 -2.86
(0.008) (0.012) (0.016)
Children at home 0.439 0.357 0.391 -4.44 -2.60
(0.008) (0.012) (0.016)
Foreign-born 0.179 0.121 0.200 -3.29 1.19
(0.006) (0.008) (0.016)
Primary school 0.189 0.143 0.209 -2.97 1.29
(0.006) (0.007) (0.014)
Secondary school 0.439 0.398 0.423 -2.22 -0.87
(0.008) (0.012) (0.016)
University/College 0.372 0.459 0.368 4.90 -0.23
(0.008) (0.012) (0.016)
Taxable income, ind 30,166 34,496 27,643 6.00 -3.50
(334) (542) (639)
Taxable income, hh 61,269 67,230 53,099 4.83 -6.62
(518) (774) (1,120)
Wealth, ind 106,218 153,454 106,339 4.78 0.01
(5,027) (9,477) (8,512)
Wealth, hh 193,103 297,005 194,535 7.30 0.10
(8,779) (13,295) (11,213)
House value, ind 62,779 80,002 57,989 6.52 -1.81
(1,382) (2,274) (2,253)
House value, hh 156,014 216,064 156,193 8.64 0.03
(3,444) (6,227) (6,039)
Note: All variables are stratification-weighted group averages. Units are [0,1]-dummies for all variables
except Age (years) and household taxable income, house value and net household wealth, which are
all in thousand Euros (using exchange rate 10 to the Swedish krona). The notation "*" denotes statistical
significance at the 5%- level.
B Further robustness checks
B.1 Further analysis of heterogeneous treatment effects
In our main analysis, we found little evidence of heterogeneity of treatment effects
across socio-economic dimensions. In this appendix section, we extend the analysis
by studying variants of the tests and some further partitions of the respondents. We
focus on heterogeneous treatment effects on two variables: the support for inheritance
taxation and the perception of inherited wealth.
Tables A4 and A5 show bivariate interactions regressions of the treatment and the
confounding variables used in Table 3. A comparison of the results shows that the
main findings do not change depending on whether one uses multivariate or bivariate
interaction regressions to study the heterogeneity of treatment effects.
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Table A4: Heterogeneous treatment effects: Low exemption tax
Support for low exemption inheritance tax
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.043 0.079** 0.088** 0.073 0.069* 0.071*
(0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.055) (0.041) (0.042)
University 0.042
(0.048)
Treat × University 0.104
(0.076)
Top income decile -0.100**
(0.046)
Treat × Top inc. decile 0.038
(0.077)
Top wealth decile 0.034
(0.058)
Treat × Top wealth decile -0.075
(0.082)
Cut taxes/transfers -0.087*
(0.048)
Treat × Cut taxes 0.007
(0.075)
Defense spending -0.148***
(0.046)
Treat × Defense 0.038
(0.084)
Left-green party support 0.069
(0.045)
Treat × Left-green support 0.012
(0.072)
Observations 3,655 3,677 3,687 3,524 3,687 3,687
Controls No No No No No No
Note: Regression coefficients from equations where dependent variable is support for low or high ex-
emption inheritance taxation. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level.
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Table A5: Heterogeneous treatment effects: High exemption tax
Support for high exemption inheritance tax
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.013 0.056 0.064 0.035 -0.011 0.049
(0.051) (0.044) (0.044) (0.060) (0.044) (0.048)
University -0.025
(0.054)
Treat × University 0.113
(0.082)
Top income decile -0.099
(0.062)
Treat × Top inc. decile 0.054
(0.092)
Top wealth decile 0.049
(0.064)
Treat × Top wealth decile -0.205**
(0.086)
Cut taxes/transfers -0.057
(0.056)
Treat × Cut taxes 0.009
(0.083)
More defense spending -0.305***
(0.049)
Treat × Defense 0.239**
(0.101)
Left-green party support 0.079
(0.054)
Treat × Left-green support -0.016
(0.080)
Observations 3,643 3,664 3,674 3,510 3,674 3,674
Controls No No No No No No
Note: Regression coefficients from equations where dependent variable is support for low or high ex-
emption inheritance taxation. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level.
Figure A1 depicts wealth gradients of inheritance tax support in the population,
partitioned into two age groups: 18–44 years and 45+ years. As in our main analysis,
the local tax support is estimated using a local smoothed regression. It should be
noted that these point estimates lack confidence intervals and should thus be viewed
as part of a descriptive analysis. One important difference between these groups is
that younger people face a larger uncertainty regarding their own current (and future)
wealth status. For this reason, it is likely that they respond differently to a wealth-
related tax than the older group which knows more about their wealth position.
Comparing the two panels, we can broadly confirm the existence of an age gradi-
ent in the treatment response. Notably, treatment effects appear to be larger among
younger people, regardless of their wealth status. At the same time, tax support is
more clearly downward-sloping among older individuals, and becomes negative for
high-wealth older individuals. This is consistent with the idea that the young face
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Figure A1: Treatment effects across the wealth and age distribution
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
In
he
ri
ta
nc
e 
ta
x 
su
pp
or
t (
%
)
0 20 40 60 80 100
Wealth rank (percentiles)
Wealth, age: 18-44 years
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
In
he
ri
ta
nc
e 
ta
x 
su
pp
or
t (
%
)
0 20 40 60 80 100
Wealth rank (percentiles)
Wealth, age: 45+ years
Treated: Low exemption tax, τLE Control: Low exemption tax, τLE
Treated: High exemption tax, τHE Control: High exemption tax, τHE
Note: The figure shows coefficients from smoothed local regressions for treatment and control groups
and the support for low and high exemption inheritance taxes, respectively.
greater uncertainty (or know less about) their own wealth status than older individu-
als. For the young, a greater uncertainty about their future wealth status, and thereby
their expected inheritance tax receipts, could mute self-interested motives and thereby
affect how people respond to our treatment.
We have also analyzed heterogeneous treatment effects on the likelihood to per-
ceive inheritance to be economically important. Figure A2 presents coefficient esti-
mates with 95-percent confidence intervals, and they indicate no strong heterogeneity
in how inherited wealth is perceived across a number of dimensions.
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Figure A2: Treatment interaction effects on perception
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Treat × Self-employed
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Treat × Top10% Income
Treat × Married
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Treat × University
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Dependent variable: Perceive a high inheritance share
Note: The graph shows coefficients (with 95% confidence intervals) from our inheritance tax support-
regression (equation 1 in the main paper), specifically for interaction terms between the inheritance
treatment dummy ”Treat” and different individual background characteristics.
Figure A3: Treatment effects on perceptions for different education levels
Treat × Post-Sec. 2yr
Treat × Primary 9-10yr
Treat × Secondary 10yr
Treat × Post-Sec. 3yr
Treat × Post-Sec. 1yr
Treat × Secondary 12yr
Treat × Secondary 11yr
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Treat × Post-Sec. 4yr
Treat × Postgrad. Ph.D
Treat × Unknown
Treat × Postgrad. Master
-1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Dependent variable: Perceive a high inheritance share
Note: The graph shows coefficients from our baseline inheritance tax support-regression (equation 1 in
the main paper) of interaction terms between is the inheritance treatment dummy ”Treat” and different
levels of education.
Further analyzing the heterogeneity of treatment effects on perceptions, Figure A3
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shows the treatment effect across different education levels (as reported in the Swedish
administrative education register). There are small differences in treatment effects
overall, but the small group of respondents with postgraduate education, particularly
with a Ph.D., the treatment seems to have been particularly influential on the respon-
dents’ perceived importance of inherited wealth.45
B.2 Sensitivity checks with respect to income measures
The main analysis of the inheritance treatment effect in Section 3 uses annual obser-
vations of individual taxable labor income. Below, we present an examination of the
robustness of those results with respect to the measurement of income. Specifically, we
use variants of one- vs three-year income averages (to account for the transitory nature
of income), a division between labor and total income (to account for potentially differ-
ent treatment effects for individuals with different configurations of labor and capital
income), pre-tax vs post tax/transfers (to account for how tax preferences possibly
differ depending on actual taxes paid or transfers received) and, finally, we examine
whether it makes a difference if we measure income at the individual or household
level (to account for how tax preferences might be affected by spousal income).
Table A6 shows that the inheritance treatment effect appears to be insensitive to
these variations in measurements. The estimated coefficients are statistically signifi-
cant and relatively stable across different specifications.
Table A6: Robustness of treatment effects with respect to income measurement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pretax labor income Pretax total income Disposable income
1-year 3-year 1-year 3-year 1-year 3-year
Individual income
Treatment 0.078** 0.074** 0.081** 0.076** 0.079** 0.076**
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034)
Household income
Treatment 0.073** 0.071** 0.075** 0.071** 0.078** 0.075**
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Observations 3,568 3,568 3,568 3,568 3,568 3,568
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control mean 0.245 0.245 0.245 0.245 0.245 0.245
Note: ”Taxable income” is earnings and self-employment income, ”total income” is the sum of earnings
and taxable capital income, and ”disposable income” is total income net of taxes and untaxed transfers.
*, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level.
45We also examined if treatment effect on perceptions differ across individuals with different educa-
tion specializations, but the differences were small and insignificant.
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B.3 Perceiving the inherited wealth share to be exactly 50%
This section presents a sensitivity check of the analysis of the perceived economic im-
portance of inherited wealth presented in Section 5.2 of the main paper. In that section,
we ran parametric tests to assess the role of perceptions in the link between our treat-
ment and the increased support for inheritance taxation. In our analysis, we used a
dummy variable PerceiveHigh that was equal to one if the share of inherited wealth was
perceived to be 50% or higher. Here, we consider an alternative specification where
we let PerceiveHigh be equal to one only of individuals perceive the inherited wealth
share to be exactly 50 percent, which corresponds to the ”correct’ share of inherited
wealth in total wealth.
We run the same three tests as in Section 5.2, namely, (i) the ”IV” approach, where
the ”first stage” now instead corresponds to perceiving the inheritance share to be
exactly 50 percent, (ii) using a response of 50% as a mediating variable, and, (iii) con-
ditioning the dependent variable (inheritance tax support) on answering 50 percent.
The results are shown in Table A7. We can see that the information treatment clearly
affected this modified perception measure. Among the treated , 23.7 percent answered
”50 percent” to the question about the inheritance share, which is an almost 50–percent
increase from the control-group level of 16.5 percent. As we discuss in Section 5.2, the
”IV” approach is imperfect since we do not know if respondents have read and un-
derstood the treatment information and the instrument does not satisfy the exclusion
restriction. Nonetheless, if we calculate the ”IV”-estimate by dividing the reduced-
form with the ”first-stage” effect, we obtain a ratio of 0.082/0.072 = 1.14. This can
be interpreted to imply that more than 100 percent of individuals who change their
perceptions in response to the treatment (in the narrower sense of the modified Per-
ceiveHigh variable) become favorable to an inheritance tax. The fact that the share
exceeds 100 percent most likely reflects that the treatment affects individuals in ways
not fully captured by our perception measure.
Table A7: Treatment effect on perceptions of inherited wealth
”Inheritance share is exactly 50 percent”
(1) (2)
Inheritance Treatment 0.072** 0.070**
(0.035) (0.034)
Observations 3,653 3,653
Controls No Yes
Control mean 0.165 0.165
Note: The table shows βˆ1 from the regression Perceive50i = β0 + β1Treatment + δ′Xi + ei, where
Perceive50i is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent selects an inheritance share in household
wealth of ”50%”. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level.
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Table A8 shows mediating variable regressions for the low and high exemption in-
heritance taxes, and the message is, once again, similar to our main analysis. Including
the perception shift as a separate variable has a significant effect on support (col. 2) at
almost seven percent. It reduces the treatment effect somewhat (although by less than
in the main analysis), and when interacted with the treatment it produces a large and
strongly statistically significant coefficient. The main effects are weaker for the high
exemption tax, in similarity to the main analysis.
Table A8: Perceiving 50% inheritance share as mediating variable
Low exemption tax (τLE) High exemption tax (τHE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.081** 0.073** 0.054 0.050
(0.034) (0.034) (0.038) (0.038)
Perceive50% 0.113** 0.105** 0.066 0.061
(0.051) (0.050) (0.052) (0.051)
Observations 3,529 3,529 3,529 3,524 3,524 3,524
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control mean 0.245 0.245 0.245 0.408 0.408 0.408
Note: *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level.
Finally, the third test of the role of the perception channel in explaining the treat-
ment effect on tax support is to condition the dependent depending on the value of the
PerceiveHigh variable. Table A9 shows that the patterns are very similar to our main
results. The main treatment effect appears to highly associated with respondents per-
ceiving a relatively large role of inheritance, with the baseline coefficient of 8.2 percent
only decreasing slightly to 7.6 percent when conditioning on answering exactly 50 per-
cent. The pattern is the same for both low and high exemption taxes, in similarity to
the main analysis.
Table A9: Conditioning support on perceiving a 50% inheritance share
Low exemption tax (τLE) High exemption tax (τLE)
Support Support, Support, Support Support, Support,
Perceive50% = 1 Perceive50% = 0 Perceive50% = 1 Perceive50% = 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.078** 0.077*** 0.003 0.052 0.075*** -0.022
(0.034) (0.023) (0.030) (0.037) (0.024) (0.034)
Observations 3,568 3,570 3,570 3,561 3,561 3,561
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control mean 0.245 0.245 0.245 0.408 0.408 0.408
Note: *, **, *** rejection of tests at 10%-, 5%-, 1%-levels.
In sum, modifying our measure of perception shifts to a narrower indicator (an-
swering exactly 50 percent, corresponding to one of our treatment facts, rather than
50% or more, as in the main analysis) has no important bearing on our findings. The
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sensitivity checks therefore confirm our conclusion that it is the information we pro-
vide about the economic importance of inherited wealth that is affecting people’s atti-
tudes to inheritance taxation.
B.4 Time to response
We have information about the time it took (in number of days) for each respondent
to respond to the survey. Furthermore, as part of Statistics Sweden’s normal survey
procedure, a postcard reminder was sent out to respondents who had not submitted
their survey after two weeks, and a second survey was sent out to those who had
not responded four weeks after the original survey was sent out. A delayed response
could provide some evidence on the persistence of the treatment effect, for example,
if the respondent read the original survey first and then waited to respond for some
time. Of course, the delay could also be due to other factors, such as forgetting about
the survey for some time or choosing not to read and answer the original survey.
Table A10 shows treatment effects across different variants of responses (any sup-
port, full support, opposing, multi-level response variable) and response delays. Look-
ing first at our main support variable (column 1), we can see that our baseline treat-
ment effect is largest and most precisely estimated for individuals who responded
immediately, with a 10 percentage point increase (as compared to the 8.6 percent in-
crease which is the baseline estimate for the total population). The treatment effect
for the group responding 2–4 weeks after the survey was sent out is 7 percent, though
with a wide confidence interval, and the treatment effect for the group responding af-
ter 4 to 8 weeks is 5 percent, also with a large standard error. While there seems to be
a decline in the treatment effect, the decline is not statistically significant. The point
estimates for those who respond with delay are still economically significant in rela-
tion to the control group support. Column 2 shows a spike in treatment effect for the
group responding after 2 to 4 weeks, while the effect is smaller for the other groups.
Column 3 shows that there is a negative treatment effect on opposition to the tax in all
three delay groups that is relatively similar in the first two groups but much smaller in
the third group. Finally, column 4 shows the results for the case where the dependent
variable reflects a cardinal coding of the response categories (as described in Section
6.2). The effects appear to be consistently positive across the three delay categories.
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Table A10: Time to response and treatment effects
Attitude to inheritance taxation (τLE)
Any support Full support Opposing
All responses
(multi-level)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
a) Direct response, <2 weeks
Treatment 0.092** 0.015 -0.095** 0.128
(0.042) (0.030) (0.043) (0.099)
Observations 2,331 2,332 2,332 2,220
Control mean 0.227 0.069 0.684 0.684
b) Response after 2-4 weeks (postcard)
Treatment 0.079 0.084** -0.105 0.265**
(0.075) (0.039) (0.075) (0.134)
Observations 593 593 593 553
Control mean 0.313 0.028 0.666 0.666
c) Response after 4-8 weeks (new survey)
Treatment 0.050 0.052 -0.012 0.150
(0.069) (0.037) (0.077) (0.151)
Observations 644 645 645 605
Control mean 0.237 0.043 0.674 0.674
Note: The table shows estimated treatment effects using our baseline model. The dependent variable is
support for, or opposition to, a low exemption inheritance tax, where ”multi-level” support represents
a four-level categorical variable of support that ranges from 0 (”Opposition”) to 3 (”Full support”). The
markers * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level, respectively.
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